This paper uses a trading volume analysis to examine the extent to which SECmandated disclosures make firms' market risk exposures more transparent to investors. We hypothesize that if the SEC's quantitative market risk disclosures reduce investor disagreements about firms' risk exposures, trading volume associated with market rate or price changes should decline after the disclosures are made public. We test for this relationship across three samples of firms that provide the mandated market risk disclosures for the first time in their 10-K reports. We find that the trading volume associated with changes in market rates or prices consistently declines after the 10-K filing for firms exposed to changes in interest rates and foreign currency exchange rates. In contrast, for firms exposed to commodity price changes, we find limited evidence of a decline in trading volume associated with changes in energy commodity prices, and no evidence of a decline in trading volume associated with changes in non-energy commodity prices. We explore several explanations for the weaker conunodity price results, some relating to potential deficiencies in the reported commodity information and others to research design issues. In general, we interpret the results as providing evidence suggesting that the SEC's quantitative market risk disclosures reduce investor disagreements about firms' exposures to market risks.
Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently issued Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (SEC 1997, hereafter "FRR 48") mandating forward-looking quantitative disclosures of market risk in companies' 10-K reports. FRR 48 defines market risk as the risk of loss due to adverse changes in market rates and prices, such as interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, and commodity prices. Following highly publicized derivative-related losses in the 1 990s, FRR 48 responds to appeals from investors and others for enhanced public disclosure of firms' exposures to market risk (Linsmeier and Pearson 1997) . The objective of this paper is to provide evidence relating to the SEC (1997) claim that FRR 48 disclosures provide investors with useful information about companies' exposures to market risk.
Market risk disclosures can reduce information asymmetries between managers and investors if firms manage risk for reasons that are not transparent to investors.' Anecdotal evidence from the early 1990s suggests that investors were not well informed about companies' risk management activities and market risk exposures. For example, AIMR (1993) and AICPA (1994) state that users of financial reports expressed confusion over the effects of innovative financial instruments on companies' risk exposures which 1 In perfect capital markets, finn level hedging of interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates or commodity prices is inefficient because investors can better diversify these risks on personal account, according to their own risk preferences (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991) . In imperfect markets, however; firm level risk management can enhance firm value in several ways. These include reducing taxes, reducing financial distress, protecting investment and responding to managerial risk-aversion (Smith and Stultz, 1985; Nance et al., 1993; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Mian, 1996; Tufano 1996). confounded their investment decisions. Supporters of FRR 48 argue that reliable market risk disclosures can "enhance the ability of investors to make investment decisions and improve the efficiency ofmarkets" (SEC 1997, Section VillA) .
Critics of FRR 48 argue that the SEC quantitative market risk disclosures are neither relevant nor reliable because managers have discretion in choosing the form of disclosure and often make debatable assumptions about future events and actions in order to compute the disclosed quantities (Roulstone, 1999) . Moreover, investors who rely on publicly available information to make investment decisions have difficulty processing quantitative, probabilistic information like that contained in FRR 48 disclosures (Hodder et. al., 2000) . Therefore, critics of FRR 48 argue that the disclosures will not help investors to assess firms' market risk exposures.
Our objective is to provide evidence bearing on the divergent claims of the supporters and critics of FRR 48 by examining the effects on trading volume of mandated disclosure of quantitative market risk information. Past theoretical and empirical research suggests that disagreements among individual investors cause increases in trading volume (Karpoff 1986; Kim and Verrecehia 1991, 1994; Kandel and Pearson 1995; Bamber et.al. 1997 Bamber et.al. , 1999 . Based on this research, we hypothesize that, prior to FRR 48, investors' confusion about firms' market risk exposures caused disagreement among investors about how changes in market rates or prices affect firm value, thereby suggesting an increase in trading volume. Second, we hypothesize that if FRR 48 market risk disclosures reliably inform investors about firms' market risk exposures, disagreements will be reduced among individual investors about how changes in market rates or prices affect firm value, thereby suggesting a decrease in trading volume after the FRR 48 disclosures.
To test these hypotheses, we develop an empirical model relating trading volume to changes in market rates or prices after controlling for trading volume associated with market-wide trading activity and firm-specific stock price changes. We examine this relationship before and after the initial 10-K filing dates of FRR 48 information for three samples of companies providing quantitative market risk information relating to interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk and commodity price risk, respectively.
Before the initial 10-K filings containing FRR 48 information we find, as predicted, significant positive sensitivity of companies' trading volume to changes in interest rates and foreign currency exchange rates. After the 10-K filing dates, we also find a significant decrease, as predicted, in the sensitivity of companies' trading volume to changes in interest rates and foreign currency exchange rates. In contrast, we find only limited evidence of similar trading volume movements in pre-and post-FRR 48 filing periods for firms exposed to changes in energy commodity prices and no evidence of the predicted trading volume movements for firms exposed to non-energy commodity prices.
We explore several explanations for the weaker commodity price results, some relating to potential deficiencies in the reported commodity information and others to research design issues. In sum, our results suggest that FRR 48 disclosures reduce investors' disagreements about firms' exposures to interest and foreign currency exchange rate risks and support the SEC (1997) claim that quantitative disclosures of market risk can facilitate investment decisions.
The paper continues as follows: Section 2 describes the SEC disclosure requirements.
Section 3 discusses related research. Section 4 develops hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research design. Section 6 outlines sample selection and section 7 presents empirical results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
SEC Market Risk Disclosures
FRR 48 was issued in response to perceived shortcomings in firms' disclosures about market risk. Issues relating to firms' quantification and disclosure of financial instruments' market risks have been accounting standard-setting priorities for more than a decade. 2 Several notorious derivative-related losses in 1994 accelerated the pace of accounting pronouncements. Yet, even after the publication of SFAS 119 (FASB 1 994d), a pronouncement meant to enhance firms' disclosures of market risks inherent in derivatives, an SEC review of filings with the Commission concluded that major deficiencies in disclosure remained (Linsmeier and Pearson 1997) . Due in part to these deficiencies, FRR 48 maintained that investors were surprised when companies reported large derivative losses in the mid-1990s.
Attempting to remedy these alleged disclosure deficiencies, FRR 48 mandates that firms provide in their 10-K reports quantitative market risk information relating to each material category of market risk to which they are exposed (e.g., interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, and/or commodity price risk).3 Within each market risk exposure category, FRR 48 allows companies to present quantitative market risk 2 See, for example, Financial Accounting Standards Board (1990 Board ( , 1991a Board ( , 1991b Board ( , 1991c Board ( , 1994a Board ( , 1994b Board ( , 1994c Board ( , 1994d Board ( , 1995 Board ( , 1996a Board ( , 1996b Board ( , 1996c Board ( , 1997 Board ( , 1998 Board ( , 1999 Board ( , 2000 The VAR analysis calculates the potential risk, with a 99% confidence level, on firm commitment exposures (cash flows), including the effects of foreign currency derivatives. (Translation exposures were not included in the VAR analysis.) The model assumes currency prices are generally normally distributed and draws volatility data from the currency markets. Estimates of correlations of market factors primarily are drawn from the JIP Morgan RiskMetricsml dataset as of December 31, 1997. Based on the overall Company currency exposure at December 31, 1997, including derivative positions, currency movements are projected to affect pre-tax cash flow by less than $250 million, with a 99% confidence level.
Quantitative information may be reported using different disclosure formats across market risk exposure categories. FRR 48 also requires reporting of separate quantitative information on the market risks inherent in trading and nontrading instruments. However, few non-financial firms have significant holdings of trading instruments, so the disclosures examined in this study generally relate to quantitative disclosures ofmarket risks inherent in nontrading instruments.
FRR 48 requires companies to present information on the market risks inherent in derivatives and other financial instruments. 5 FRR 48 includes more than derivatives in its scope because a stated goal of the disclosures is to reflect the risk of loss in all market risk sensitive instruments (SEC 1997, Section II) . Despite this goal, FRR 48 recognizes that market risk exposures may be inherent in other instruments and positions not explicitly scoped into the disclosures (e.g., commodity positions and cash flows from 6 anticipated transactions). As a result, FRR 48 encourages companies to voluntarily include any such instruments and positions in their disclosures and, to the extent they fail to do so, to discuss this as a limitation ofthe disclosures.
The SEC phased in the FRR 48 disclosure rules over two years, requiring firms it believed were most familiar with measuring and managing risk to comply with the disclosure requirements in SEC filings for fiscal years ending after June 15, 1997. These firms included (1) bank and thrift institutions and (2) non-financial enterprises with equity-market capitalization in excess of $2.5 billion on January 28, 1997. All other firms were required to comply with FRR 48 in SEC filings for fiscal years ending after June 15,
1998.
Other financial instruments are defined by ERR 48 to include all non-derivative instruments included in the scope of SEAS 107 (FASB 1991a) . This category includes, for example, investments, loans, structured notes, mortgage-backed securities, indexed debt instruments, interest-only and principal-only obligations, deposits and other debt obligations.
6 FRR 48 omitted these items from its requirements because at the time of its issuance the amount and timing of the cash flows in such positions and transactions were thought to be often more difficult to estimate and many risk measurement systems did not scope such items into their quantitative assessments of market risk.
The SEC pledged in FRR 48 to monitor the effectiveness of the market risk disclosures and to make appropriate amendments when necessary, promising to Congress a mandatory review of requirements during the year 2000. This study provides evidence facilitating such assessment. We focus on the initial 10-K disclosures for firms required to comply with FRR 48 for fiscal years ending after June 15, 1997 in order to provide timely evidence about the effectiveness of the disclosures and because it is costly and time-consuming to hand-collect the disclosure data.
Research on Market Risk Exposures
This study relates to two streams of research on market risk exposures. The first stream measures stock price sensitivities to the three different market rate or price risks examined in this research (i.e., interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk and commodity price risk). In addition, this stream explores whether equity price sensitivities to changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and commodity prices are cross-sectionally related to limited amounts of (mostly private, industry-specific) information made available to researchers about market risk positions of sample firms.
Four studies comprise this literature stream. First, using private, regulatory data on the use of interest rate derivatives by savings and loan institutions (S&Ls), Schrand (1997) shows that the sensitivity of S&Ls' equity prices to interest rates is dampened by the magnitude of derivatives usage. Second, using private information generated by analysts, Tufano (1998) shows that the sensitivity of gold mining firms' stock prices to gold-price changes is related to the level and volatility of the price of gold, the level of firm diversification and the amount of production hedged. Third, using public disclosures, Jorion (1990) provides evidence that firms' stock price sensitivity to the U.S. dollar price of a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies increases for firms with more foreign operations. However, Bartov and Bodnar (1994) document that the market does not fully incorporate information about firms' sensitivity to currency fluctuations until that sensitivity affects reported accounting earnings, thereby suggesting that current public disclosures of the extent of foreign operations provide only incomplete measures of firms' sensitivities to currency risk.
This first line of literature is germane to our study because it suggests that market rate or price changes affect investor returns. It also shows that certain market risk exposure information produced for limited private or public purposes is associated with equity return sensitivities to changes in market rates or prices. Yet, none of the studies in this first line of research was designed to examine the usefulness to market participants of comprehensive public disclosures of quantitative information about market risk, similar to those required by FRR 48. However, because Schrand (1997) employs regulatory data similar to that required under the tabular disclosure alternative in FRR 48, she suggests that FRR 48 disclosures may be useful to investors. 7
The second stream of literature relevant to this research is designed specifically to examine the usefulness of the FRR 48 quantitative market risk information. However, two of the three studies in this literature do not employ actual FRR 48 data (Raigopal 1999 and Raigopal and Venkatachalam 2000) . Instead, these studies develop proxies for FRR 48 disclosures from information required to be disclosed prior to the effective date Wong (1999) also suggests that the more comprehensive disclosures required by ERR 48 might overcome some of the deficiencies in SEAS 119 information and be more highly correlated with firms' market risk exposures. He documents weak evidence of an association between finns' foreign currency risk exposures and firms' SEAS 119 (FASB 1 994d) derivative disclosures.
of FRR 48 by firms in the oil and gas industry. Rajgopal (1999) develops proxies for FRR 48's tabular and fair-value sensitivity disclosures from FAS 69 (FASB 1982) information on reserves' fair values and FAS 119 (FASB 1994d) information on firms' derivative positions. He reports significant associations between FRR 48 disclosure proxies and firms' stock return sensitivities to oil and gas price changes. Raigopal and Venkatachalam (2000) assess the relation between the earnings-and returns-sensitivities to oil prices for a sample of 25 U.S. petroleum refiners and find a significant relation between a proxy for FRR 48 earnings sensitivity disclosures and market perceptions of risk exposure. The third study in this research stream examines the effect that disclosures of FRR 48 data have on aggregate market assessments of the market risk exposures of firms in the oil and gas industry (Thornton and Welker 2000) . This study finds that oil and gas producers making sensitivity or VAR disclosures under FRR 48 experience greater changes in oil and gas betas (defined as the sensitivity of equity returns to oil and gas price changes) than non-disclosers.
In sum, this second stream of research suggests that FRR 48 market risk disclosures provide information useful to investors. To date, however, the evidence is limited to firms in a single industry and focuses on the relation between public disclosures of market risk and investors' aggregate market risk perceptions (e.g., oil and gas betas). In contrast, we examine the impact of FRR 48 disclosures on a broad sample of non-financial firms and explore whether FRR 48 disclosures reduce individual investors' disagreements about firms' market risk exposures, as indicated by declines in trading volume associated with changes in market rates or prices. We examine changes in trading volume rather than changes in market rate or price betas because trading volume captures the effects of FRR 48 information on individual investors' perceptions, while market rate or price betas capture the effects of the information on aggregate investors' perceptions (Beaver 1968 , Bamber 1987 ).
Hypothesis Development
Theoretical and empirical research suggest that trading volume is associated with at least three factors. First, "normal" trading volume results from continual variations in investor demand prices due to individual liquidity needs and portfolio rebalancing (Karpoff, 1986) . Second, trading volume can arise from the precision and surprise motivating the average investors' belief revision (Abarbanell et al. 1 995)~8 Finally, trading volume results from heterogeneous belief revisions that stem from disagreement among investors (Karpoff 1986; Kim and Verrecchia 1991, 1994; Kandel and Pearson 1995) . Disagreement is a multifaceted construct encompassing three aspects: dispersion in prior beliefs, change in dispersion, and differential interpretation. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that trading volume is positively associated with each of these aspects of disagreement (Bamber et al. 1997 (Bamber et al. , 1999 . We argue below that these constructs are linked to investor uncertainty about risk exposures.
Dispersion in prior beliefs refers to the pre-disclosure level of variation in investors'
beliefs about a security's fundamentals (e.g., mean and variance of expected cash flows).
Greater dispersion in prior beliefs implies greater investor uncertainty about future firm value. Change in dispersion is the difference in the level of belief dispersion before and after an information announcement. Negative (positive) changes in belief dispersion indicate that the new information caused investor beliefs to converge (diverge).
If investors are unclear about firms' market risk exposures, we expect wide dispersion in their beliefs about the impact on firm value of changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and commodity prices. We also expect significant changes in this belief dispersion as market rates or prices change. That is, investors process changes in market rates or prices with idiosyncratic, noisy beliefs about the effects of the changes on firms' exposures. When such changes occur, dispersion in their beliefs therefore will increase or decrease, depending on the level of agreement or disagreement among investors about the effects of the changes on firm value.
Differential interpretations cause investor beliefs to move in opposite directions and either flip (i.e., reorder) or diverge (i.e., move apart) because of information disclosure.
The degree of differential interpretation is positively associated with changes in investors' demand prices following the release of new information. Investor uncertainty and confusion about firms' market risk exposure increases the likelihood that changes in market rates or prices will be perceived as "good" news by some investors and "bad" news by others. 9
This discussion leads to our two main hypotheses. First, we predict that before the public disclosure of the SEC's quantitative market risk information there is a positive Belief jumbling is another aspect of disagreement that appears in the volume literature. Belief jumbling occurs when investors' beliefs about firm value are reordered (Barron 1995 and Bainber et al, 1997) . Beliefjumbling can be caused by either dispersion in prior beliefs or by differential interpretations. Thus, belief jumbling is not a unique, conceptually distinct aspect of disagreement but is rather an empirical observation that may arise from both differences in prior beliefs and differential interpretations of information.
relationship, ceteris paribus, between market rate or price changes and trading volume, which is consistent with an increase in trading volume associated with market rate or price changes in pre-FRR 48 disclosure period. A positive relation in the pre-disclosure period reflects the investor uncertainty and disagreement that the SEC release is intended to moderate. Second, if the disclosures provide relevant and reliable information to investors, they should reduce one or more aspects of investors' disagreements about the effects of market rate or price changes on firm value. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we predict that the trading volume associated with market rate or price changes is lower in the period afterthe initial disclosure of FRR 48 information.
Research Design
Equation (1) below gives the general form of the regression models we use. The precise forms of the models estimated are defined later. V~~= 13o + 13ir~t + P2mt + j33~ujt + 1 34JP~tu~t +~ (1) where:
= firm subscript, t = time subscript, j = subscript denoting the market rate or price change about which firms provide quantitative disclosures (1 = interest rate; 2 = foreign currency exchange rate; 3 = commodity price), V = percentage of outstanding shares traded, r = absolute value of stock rate of return, m = market volume as a percent of total shares outstanding, u = variable based on absolute value of change in underlying market rate orprice (i.e., interest rate, foreign currency exchange rate or commodity price), P = indicator variable, equal to 1 on days occurring after ("post") the initial 10-K filing containing the FRR 48 market risk disclosures, 0 otherwise.
To test the hypotheses, our goal is to construct a model that focuses on the amount of trade relating to investor disagreements after controlling for trade stemming from the other two sources discussed previously. Like Bamber et al. (1997 Bamber et al. ( , 1999 and Tkac (1999), we control for liquidity trading by including a variable measuring market-wide trading volume, in. 10 Following Abarbanell et al. (1995) and Bamber et al. (1997 Bamber et al. ( , 1999 , we control for the precision and surprise motivating the average investors' belief revision by including the variable, r, the absolute value of the rate of return on the firm's equity
shares." Consistent with previous research, we expect a positive relation between trading volume, V, and both m and r.
If investors disagree about a firm's market risk exposure, then the extent to which individual investors' demand prices differ will increase with the magnitude of the market rate or price change. Large disagreements will arise in the presence of both large increases and decreases in market rates or prices. Accordingly, we include a variable based on absolute value of the change in the market rate or price, u, as a measure of potential disagreement about the effects of market risk exposures on firm value. Since we 10 We do not control for firm size for two reasons. First, Bamber et al. (1999) do not find a significant relation between firm size and trading volume. Second, by construction, our sample consists of large firms with market capitalization exceeding $2.5 billion; this limits the variation in firm size. As a sensitivity check, we reran all our analyses with the log of market value of equity (firm size) included as a control variable and find that our inferences are unaltered.
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Karpoff (1987) reviews literature that indicates trading volume increases with the absolute magnitude of price changes and that this trading volume increase is higher, on average, when stock prices are increasing rather than decreasing. To allow for differential volume reactions when stock prices are increasing rather than decreasing, we repeat the analyses after including an additional variable that reflects the sign of the contemporaneous stock price return. Our inferences are unaffected.
cannot specify a precise functional form mapping changes in underlying market rates or prices into trading volume, we define the variable u in two ways:
1. The absolute value of percentage changes in the underlying market rate or price, and 2. A dummy variable equal to one on days when relatively large percentage changes occur in the absolute value of the underlying market rate or price (zero otherwise).
Observations that fall above the median absolute percentage change in market rate or price are considered "relatively large" changes. The median absolute percentage change in market rate or price is defined using representative rate and price changes occurring around the SEC filing dates of sample firms. This period begins six calendar months (180 days) before the first sample filing date and ends six months afterthe last sample filing date.
We evaluate the two hypotheses based on the signs of the coefficients, f33 and j 3~t.
Coefficient~captures the impact of investors' disagreements about the implications of market rate or price changes on trading volume during the pre-disclosure period. Since prior research shows that trading volume increases with investors' disagreement, we predict j3~to be positive. Coefficient fri measures the change in the relative impact of investors' disagreements on trading volume in the post-disclosure period. If the SEC disclosures are relevant and reliable enough to reduce investors' disagreement, we expect 134 to be negative. That is, a negative 134 coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that the mandated disclosures are associated with a reduction in investors' disagreements about risk exposures and therefore a reduction in trading volume in response to changes in underlying market rates orprices.
We estimate equation (1) with pooled data. We include 120 trading days of market data before and 120 days after the 10-K filing date for each sample firm.' 2 This period corresponds to approximately 6 calendar months and should provide enough observations and variation in market rates and prices to efficiently estimate the impact of changes in market rates or prices on trading volume.
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Bamber et al. 1999) , we take logarithms of continuous variables (after adding one to avoid taking the log of zero) to control for skewness in the distributions of the regression variables.13 We also include one lag and one lead in market rate or price change in the regression model to accommodate the possibility that trading volume on day t occurs in anticipation of day t+1 market rate or price change or represents additional reaction to the change occurring on day t-1. Accordingly, we estimate the following regression models:
+~fi4,kJ:~f*~%AFXL+k +eit
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We also use a 90-day trading window and find statistical inferences unchanged. 
LNVOL
Log (1 + number of shares traded divided by the number of outstanding shares).
LNMKTVOL Log (1 + number of shares traded in the market index divided by the number of shares outstanding for firms in the index).
LNIRETI Log (1 + the absolute value ofthe stock rate ofreturn).
I%AIRI
Either: a) log (1 + the absolute value of the percentage change in interest rate index occurring on day t), or b) dummy variable set equal to one if the absolute value of the percentage change in interest rate index occurring on day t is above the median of the empirical distribution of such changes over a period surrounding sample 10-K filing dates, zero otherwise. P Dummy variable equal to one on days following the initial 10-K filing containing FRR 48 disclosures, zero otherwise.
I%AFXI
Either: a) log (1 + the absolute Value ofthe percentage change in the foreign currency exchange rate index on day t) or b) dummy variable set equal to one if the absolute value of the percentage change in the foreign currency exchange rate index on day t is above the median of the empirical distribution of such changes over a period surrounding sample 10-K filing dates, zero otherwise.
I%ACOI
Either a) log (1 + the absolute value of the percentage change in the commodity price index occurring on day t), or b) dummy variable set equal to one if the absolute value of the percentage change in the commodity price index occurring on day t is above the median of the empirical distribution of such changes over a period surrounding sample 10-K filing dates, zero otherwise.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Data on returns, trading volume and market rates and prices come from DataStream.
Data on market risk disclosures come from the EDGAR database. DataStream reveals 416 non-financial SEC registrants with a market capitalization of at least $2.5 billion as of January 28, 1997.14 Non-financial firms with market capitalization of this magnitude or higher were required to comply with FRR 48 in the initial year it became effective. Of these, we eliminate 10 firms that could not be located on the EDGAR database, so we
could not obtain their 10-K reports. Sixteen other firms experienced takeovers before their 10-K filing dates and thus were eliminated. Finally, we eliminate 12 firms that experienced structural changes during the disclosure period that might alter their market risk exposures (e.g. the surviving firm from a merger creating vertical integration). This sample screening process yields 378 non-financial firms that must provide market risk disclosures under FRR 48 for the first time in late 1997 or early 1998.
We are able to retrieve price, return, trading volume and market capitalization data around the initial 10-K filing date for 365 of these 378 firms. Our empirical tests focus primarily on the subsets of these 365 firms that made tabular, sensitivity or VAR disclosures relating to each of three types of market risk exposure:interest rate, foreign currency exchange rate and commodity price. Thus we arrive at the following three samples, which are not mutually exclusive. 14 We do not include financial institutions and insurance companies in our sample because these institutions were making similar disclosures before the SEC release and have been studied extensively (e.g., Barth et al. 1996 , McAnally 1996 Collins and Venkatachalam 1996; Venkatachalam 1996; Schrand 1997). exposures.
3. Commodity sample. This includes 62 firms (ofthe 365) that made tabular, sensitivity or VAR disclosures related to commodity price risk exposures.
Consistent with Roulstone (1999), the numbers above reflect the fact that not every firm makes a disclosure in each risk category. Indeed, we find that 129 firms do not provide market risk disclosures for any of the three market rates or prices we consider.
These firms do not provide market risk disclosures either because they do not face the particular market risk or they fail to provide a disclosure and do not explain why. For a sample of 25 firms audited by the same Big 6 firm, Roulstone reports that 56% make an interest rate risk disclosure, 52% make a foreign currency exchange rate risk disclosure and only 28% make a disclosure related to commodity price risk. Our percentages are similar to (though lower than) those reported by Roulstone: 54% of our sample firms make an interest rate risk disclosure, 41% make a foreign currency exchange rate risk disclosure and 17% make a commodity price risk disclosure. Like Roulstone, we find that the majority of disclosures are sensitivity analyses or VAR, with fewer tabular disclosures.' 5
Insert Table 1 Panel A of Table 1 gives descriptive information on selected variables during the 15 Elmy et al (1998) and Roulstone (1999) note that compliance with the tabular requirements is inconsistent, creating a set of firms that do not clearly provide or fail to provide tabular disclosure. We consider a firm as having provided a tabular disclosure only if the firm's disclosure indicates notional amounts and contractual rates by year ofmaturity. Tabulated disclosures that fail to at least provide this level ofinformation are considered non-disclosures. Jones Industrial firms were traded on the average day during our sample period.
MKTVOL is comparable to but (not surprisingly) less variable than trading volume (VOL) at the individual firm level for our sample firms.
The market rate and price change variables also are collected over the 468 days comprising our sample period (see note 16). In measuring %AIRj, we use 10-year Treasury bond yields because we expect the most significant interest rate risk exposures for non-financial firms to stem from long-term borrowings and related derivatives. Over the sample period, the absolute value of the percentage change in 10-year Treasury bond rates averages about 0.7% with a median of 0.5%. We use a US Federal Reserve tradeweighted index for foreign currency exchange rate changes to define I%AFXI, because the sample firms are typically large multinationals that are expected to have broad international operations. Over the sample period, the absolute value of the percentage 16 Filing dates for sample firms range between 7/23/97 and 6/26/98, about 11 calendar months. We estimate models over the 120 trading days before and after these filings dates. Thus, our full sample test period almost spans the two years (468 trading days) corresponding to the 1997 and 1998 calendar years. Not surprisingly, our 10-K filing dates are clustered in March 1998, the typical filing month for a calendar year-end firm. Specifically, 17.5% of our filing dates fall in 1997, 7.7% in January or February 1998, 65.2% in March 1998 and the remaining 9.6% are filed in April through June 1998. 17 In performing this calculation, we deleted 20 observations where VOL exceeded 1. For all issues on the NYSE, the 1998 NYSE Fact Book reports daily trading volume of about 0.3%. Our sample finns, larger than average size, are traded more actively than this 0.3% average. change in the value of the US dollar versus a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies averages about 0.25% with a median of about 0.19%.
Our sample firms provide disclosures relating to a variety of commodity-price exposures such as oil, gas, agricultural products and precious metals. More than 60% of the firms in the commodity sample report exposure to energy-related commodity prices. Therefore, instead of using a composite index for all commodities, I%ACOI, we consider two indices provided by Goldman Sachs: a) the Goldman Sachs Energy Sector Index, I%AENERI, and b) the Goldman Sachs Non-Energy Sector Index, I%ANENERI. In estimating equation (4), each of these indices is multiplied by a dummy variable set equal to one for firms indicating an exposure to a) an energy-related commodity (40 firms) or b) a non-energy related commodity (25 firms), respectively, zero otherwise. 18 Over the sample period, the absolute value of the percentage change in the Goldman Sachs NonEnergy Sector Index has a mean of about 0.4%, while the Energy Sector Index has a substantially higher mean of 1~3%J9
The total offirms exposed to energy prices (40) and firms exposed to non-energy prices (25) exceeds the total commodity sample of 62 because some finns report an exposure to both energy and nan-energy related commodities. 19 For each of the variables reported in Panel A of Table 1 , we also compared the distributional characteristics ofthe variables across the pre-and post-filing periods. Since filing dates vary across finns, we perform this analysis at the firm-day level. Thus, the same daily movement in interest rates, etc. is represented in the data for each firm, potentially in the pre-period for some firms and the post-period for other firms. This analysis suggests that all variables have a very similar distribution across the pre-and post-filing periods, with one exception. VOL is on average somewhat higher in the post-period (averaging 0.85%) when compared to the pre-period (averaging 0.73%). However, this difference may not be surprising because our post-period follows the filing of 10-K information, which could be expected to generate additional trading volume. Since we predict a decrease in the relation between trading volume and market rate or price changes in the post-period, this general increase in total trading volume in the postperiod works against our hypotheses. We also examine the correlation between the log of market value of equity and each ofthe variables reported in Panel A of Table 1 . None of the correlations is statistically significant, the highest observed (absolute value) correlation being -0.037. Table 1 gives the Pearson correlation coefficients among MKTVOL and the absolute percentage change in market rate or price variables. For consistency with the subsequent empirical analysis, we report the correlations using the natural logarithm of(1 + each variable). These correlations suggest that the pairwise collinearity among these variables is not a significant problem. In addition, to further assess if our analyses suffer from collinearity problems we measure the condition index for each regression. The largest condition index for any regression lies between 13 and 14, well below the critical value of 30 suggested by Belsey et al. (1980) .
Panel B of

Results
Tables 2 through 4 contain the regression results for the interest, foreign exchange and commodity samples, respectively. Since autocorrelation is a major concern in estimating the volume equation using daily trading volume data, we use an estimation procedure that controls for first order serial correlation in errors. In addition, to control for potential heteroskedasticity we use generalized least squares estimation. 20
Insert Table 2 Interest (IR) Sample Table 2 contains results for the IR sample of 198 firms that provide tabular, sensitivity or VAR disclosures with respect to interest rate changes. Panel A relates to the continuous specification of the interest rate variable, while Panel B relates to the dummy variable specification. For brevity, we report in Table 2 (and all remaining tables) only 20 White's~2 statistic and the Durbin-Watson statistic confirmed, respectively, the presence of heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in our data. We estimate the regression using the PROC MODEL procedure in SAS to perform a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation that uses both a GLS variance covariance matrix and a first order autoregressive correction. the aggregated coefficient across days t-l, t, and t+l relating to the market rate or price change variable, e.g., I%AIRI. This aggregated coefficient is similar to a Dimson-adjusted beta.
In both panels, we find that the coefficient of.market volume (LNMKTVOL) is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), as predicted. There is also a strong, positive association between trading volume (LNVOL) and absolute return LNIRETI, as evidenced by the statistically significant positive coefficients in both panels (132 = 0.11, p <0.01).
If investors disagree about the implications of interest rate changes for firm value, larger changes in interest rates are associated with greater differences of opinion about changes in firm value and therefore greater trading volume. In Table 2 , under both the continuous and dummy variable specifications, trading volume in the pre-10-K filing period increases significantly with the absolute magnitude of changes in interest rates (j33 > 0, significant at p < 0.01). In addition, the aggregate coefficient on P*I%AIRI (f3~) is significantly negative for both the dummy variable and continuous specifications. This result indicates that trading volume associated with interest rate changes declined following firms' 10-K filings and suggests that the SEC's quantitative market risk disclosures reduced investor disagreements regarding firms' exposure to interest rate risk.
Insert Table 3
Foreign Exchange (FX) Samnle Table 3 contains the results for the FX sample of 150 firms providing market risk disclosures with respect to foreign currency exchange rates. In both Panel A (continuous specification) and Panel B (dummy variable specification) the coefficients on LNMKTVOL and LNIRETI are statistically significant (p < 0.01) with the predicted positive signs. In addition, in both panels as predicted, the aggregate coefficient on I%AFXI in the pre-period is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that, ceteris paribus, volume increased significantly with foreign exchange rate changes prior to FRR 48 disclosures. Finally, the negative significant aggregate coefficients on P*I%AFXI in both panels indicate that trading volume associated with exchange rate changes consistently fell, as predicted, following firms' 10-K filings.
Insert Table 4
Commodity (CO) Sample Table 4 gives results for the sample of 62 firms that provide commodity price risk disclosures. As before, in both panels, the coefficients on LNMKTVOL and LN!RETI are statistically significant (p < 0.01) with the predicted positive signs. As described previously, when assessing the effects of FRR. 48 disclosures on investors' perceptions of firms' commodity price exposures, we consider separately firms exposed to energy prices (40 firms) and non-energy prices (25 firms). In the continuous specification (see Panel A), we find, as predicted, a statistically significant positive relation between energy price changes and trading volume in the pre-disclosure period. In addition, as predicted, we find that the aggregate coefficient on the percentage change in energy prices in Panel A is negative and statistically significant in the post-period (coefficient = -0.02, p .02). We do not, however, observe similar results in Panel B (dummy variable specification); neither 13~nor f3~is statistically different from zero. In addition, the coefficients on the non-energy sector index for both the pre-and post 10-K filing periods are consistently not statistically different from zero in both panels. We view these results as providing limited support for our hypotheses relating to energy exposures and no support for our hypotheses related to non-energy exposures.
Several explanations can be provided for the generally weaker commodity sample results. First, the less significant results could stem from the smaller sample sizes for the commodity sample (40 energy firms and 25 non-energy firms) compared to 198 interest sample firms and 150 foreign exchange sample firms. These smaller sample sizes reduce the statistical power for the commodity sample hypothesis tests.
Second, the commodity index measures employed may not capture well the basket of commodity exposures to which the sample firms are exposed. This is especially true for firms exposed to non-energy prices and may provide an explanation for the difference in the energy and non-energy results. Firms in the non-energy sample may be exposed to only a few non-energy commodity price changes. However, the non-energy commodity price index employed captures price changes due to numerous non-energy exposures, including various agricultural products and precious metals. Since changes in these commodity prices often are not highly correlated, a broad based non-energy index is likely to be a noisy proxy for the commodity price risk exposures of sample firms. Similar concerns are less prevalent for the energy firms because the number of exposures included in the energy price index is fewer and changes in the various energy prices included in the index are likely to be more highly correlated.
Third, the commodity results may be less significant because FRR 48 does not require firms to include commodity positions in the quantitative market risk disclosures reported in 10-K filings (see section 2 for further details). Thus, when compared to the interest rate risk and foreign currency exchange rate risk disclosures, the commodity price risk disclosures are more likely to be incomplete, thereby failing to provide as accurate an assessment of firms' market risk exposures. Prior research that has examined the association between FRR 48-type disclosures and the sensitivity of stock prices to oil and gas price changes (e.g., Raigopal 1999) provides further insight. Recall that in the oil and gas industry there exist additional industry-specific disclosure requirements (e.g., FAS 69 (FASB 1982) ) that enhance the commodity price market risk disclosures, thereby diminishing this concern for the oil and gas firms included in the energy sample. The fact that, in the presence of these additional disclosures, research (see section 3 for a review) has found FRR 48 disclosures to be useful to investors provides both additional support for this explanation and suggests another potential reason why we find stronger results for energy than non-energy firms. We leave the exploration of these issues to future research.
Comparison Firm Analyses
An alternative interpretation ofthe results is that investors' disagreements decline due to the release of information other than the FRR 48 mandated disclosures. For example, it is possible that any observed change in trading volume after 10-K filing dates is associated with the disclosure of other information in the 10-K, not with the market risk disclosures themselves (Cready and Mynatt, 1991, Walther, 1997) . To test for this, we repeat the analyses for sample firms using 10-K filing dates for the prior year when market risk disclosures were not required. If information other than the market risk disclosures is driving the results, we expect similar results for the previous year's filings.
It is also plausible that the pattern of trading volume before and after the 10-K filing dates may not be restricted to firms that disclose market risk exposures in the year FRR 48 became effective. To control for this alternative explanation, we repeat our analyses on the sample of 129 non-financial firms that do not provide any market risk disclosures in 10-K filings during the sample period, although they are subject to the FRR 48 requirements. Table 5 contains the results of analyses for a) disclosing firms in the prior year and b) non-disclosing firms in the first year of the mandated disclosures. For brevity, we only present the results obtained from estimating the continuous specification. The results are qualitatively similar for the dummy variable specification. The results for the interest, foreign exchange and commodity specifications are presented in Panels A, B and C respectively. In short, we do not find any statistically significant coefficients associated with P*I%AIRI, P*I%AFXI, P*I%AENERI, P*I%ANENERI in the prior year neither for the disclosure sample nor for non-disclosers in the year of mandated disclosure. We, therefore, conclude that the decline in trading volume associated with market rate or prices changes after the initial 10-K filing containing FRR 48 disclosures is not due to a trading volume phenomenon that is pervasive after each 10-K filing date.
Insert Table 5 8
. Concluding Remarks
We test an empirical model relating changes in market rates or prices to trading volume, before and after firms made their first disclosures of market risk exposures mandated by FRR 48. By controlling for effects of market wide volume and firm-specific stock price changes, empirical tests are designed to focus on trading volume arising from investors' disagreements about the effects of market rate or price changes on firm value.
The results are consistent with predictions for firms disclosing quantitative market risk information with respect to two market rates: interest rates and foreign currency exchange rates. We document positive associations between changes in these market rates and trading volume in the pre-disclosure period. We also document a decline in the relation between changes in these market rates and trading volume in the post-disclosure period.
We interpret the latter result as evidence of usefulness of SEC-mandated market risk disclosures in reducing investors' disagreements about firms' market risk exposures. A policy interpretation of the result is that the SEC release made relevant information concerning firms' market risk exposures more widely available to investors, enhancing investors' ability to make informed decisions. In addition, by reducing trading volume attributable to investor disagreements about the effects of firms' market risk exposures on firm value, the new disclosures reduce the transaction costs of trading based on uncertain information. In sum, while the evidence in the paper does not support the conclusion that the benefits of the FRR 48 disclosures exceed the costs, it is consistent with the SEC's claims that benefits exist. Thornton, D. and M. Welker (2000) "Impact of mandated market risk disclosures on investor-perceived exposure to commodity prices: The case of oil and gas producers," working paper, Queen's University. log (1 + number of shares traded divided by the number ofoutstanding shares). log (1 + number of shares traded in the Dow Jones Industrial average firms divided by the number of shares outstanding for such firms). log (1 + the absolute value of the stock rate of return). Either: a) log (1 + the absolute value of the percentage change in long-term (10-year Treasury bond) interest rates occurring on day t), or b) dummy variable set equal to one if the absolute value of the percentage change in long-term (10 year Treasury bond) interest rates occurring on day t is above the median of the empirical distribution of such changes over a period surrounding sample 10-K filing dates, zero otherwise. Dummy variable equal to one on days following the initial 10-K filing containing FRR 48 disclosures, zero otherwise. log (1 + number of shares traded in the Dow Jones Industrial average firms divided by the number of shares outstanding for such firms).
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